Aaron Zimmerman

Prof Zimmerman works on the philosophy of mind, with a focus on moral psychology and moral epistemology. He has written extensively on self-knowledge, the nature of belief, and the origins of pragmatism. He received his PhD from Cornell University

Publications

Books Authored

Alexander Bain: Philosopher of Mind, under contract with Oxford University Press.

Belief: A Pragmatic Picture, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018).

Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge (2010).

 

Volumes Edited

Philosophical Studies, 176, 4 (April 2019).

with K. Jones and M. Timmons, The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge (2019).

 

Articles

“Pragmatism, Truth and the Ethics of Belief,” William James Studies, 16, 1 (Fall 2020).

“Belief: A Pragmatic Picture – A Precis,” William James Studies, 16, 1 (Fall 2020).

“In Defense of a Pragmatic Picture of Belief,” Philosophical Studies, 177 (2020), pp. 449-57.

“Moral Epistemology: Science,” in Zimmerman, Jones and Timmons (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge (2019).

“Veneer Theory,” in D. Manchuca (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Skepticism, London: Routledge (2018).

“Moral Epistemology,” Oxford Bibliographies On-Line (2014).

“Mikhail’s Naturalized Moral Rationalism,” Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (2013), pp. 1-22.

“Moral Skepticism,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFolette (ed.), Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell (2011)

“Introspection, Explanation and Perceptual Experience: Resisting Disjunctivism,” in D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford UP (2012), chapter 13

“Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions,” with Josh May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Jay Hull, Review of Philosophy and Psychology (formerly European Review of Philosophy), Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010), pp. 265-73      

“A Conflict in Common Sense Moral Psychology,” Utilitas, 21, 4 (2009)       

“Self-Knowledge: Rationalism v. Empiricism,” Philosophy Compass, 3/2 (2008), pp. 325-352.                

“Hume’s Reasons,” Hume Studies, 33, 2 (2007), pp. 211-56

“The Nature of Belief,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14, 11 (2007), pp. 61-82   

“Against Relativism,” Philosophical Studies, 133 (2007), pp. 313-348

“Self-Verification and the Content of Thought,” Synthese, 149 (March 2006), pp. 59-75

“Putting Extrospection to Rest,” Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (October 2005), pp. 658-66

“Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke’s Criticisms of Constitutivism,” Philosophical Studies, 128 (March 2006) pp. 337-379

“Unnatural Access,” Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 216 (July 2004), pp. 435-438

 

Book Reviews

The Self and Self-Knowledge, Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2013).

When Truth Gives Out, by Mark Richard, Mind (2011).

Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, by Jennifer Lackey, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2010).

Fear of Knowledge, by Paul Boghossian, Ars Disputandi, Vol. 7 (2007).

Relativism, by Maria Baghramian, Ars Disputandi, Vol. 6 (2006).